what it is to use power over someone against his will,6 I propose this reformulation of Mill's anti-paternalist principle: paternalistic poli cies are restrictions on a person's liberty which are justified exclusively by consideration for that person's own good or welfare, and which are carried out either against his present will (when his present will is not explicitly overridden by his own prior commitment), or against his prior conmitment (when his present will is explicitly over ridden by his own prior commitment). Mill's principle states that paternalistic policies so defined are always wrong. This definition excludes from the category of paternalism sane types of restriction on liberty ordinarily characterized as paternalistic.7 Thus a recent article on the topic offers as a case of prima facie justified paternalistic interference taking an unconscious injured per son to the hospital.° According to the definition just offered rushing an unconscious accident victim to the hospital is not paternalistic. The same article suggests that shoving out of harm's way a man who un knowingly is in the path of a runaway truck is another case of prima facie justified paternalism. This example is only slightly problematic. Unless there is some reason to believe that a beneficial shove in this setting would conflict with the man's will, such a case likewise falls outside the category of paternalism. Consider also restrictions on duelling. Suppose every person in a society prefers most of all not to be confronted with duelling situations, and secondly prefers to preserve his honor by making the conventionally appropriate response to duelling situations when they arise. Assume that a legal ban on duelling prevents any duelling situations from arising. On these assumptions, and assuming further that persons have no other desires that are relevant to the issue of the desirability of duelling regulations, a legal ban against duelling would be non-paternalistic, since nobody's freedom is being restricted against his will. (Of course in any actual society not everybody will have this pattern of desires, but if it is this pattern of desires that generates reasons for forbidding duelling then the anti-duelling law (even if it is unfair or unjust) is non-paternalistic.) Laws forbidding slavery contracts or the lending of money at usurious rates of interest may or may not be paternalistic depending on the moti vation of the law-makers. Suppose it is assumed that slavery contracts or high-interest loans will be agreed upon only when one of the parties to the contract is in a very weak bargaining position. In a time of g Further clarification of the "against his will" proviso appears in Section III below.
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Of the alleged instances of paternalism here discussed, five appear on a list of examples of paternalism supplied by Dworkin to illustrate his definition of the concept, op. cit., p . 175 • O°J ohn Hodson, "The Principle of Paternalism," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (January, 1977), p. 62. famine Jones has a loaf of bread that he would be willing to part with for 75^, while Smith desperately needs the loaf in order to stave off starvation and so would be willing to pay virtually any price for it. In this situation Smith benefits from the setting of a legal ceiling on the amount of money he is permitted to pay for the bread. It's not that the legislators need suppose that Smith is likely to make a foolish bar gain if left to his own devices; it's rather that if Jones and Smith are both rational bargainers of equal skill then the eventual bargain struck is likely to be highly unfavorable to Smith due to his weak bargaining position. A rational Smith will welcome legal limits on valid contracts since these strengthen his bargaining situation. In passing laws that withhold legal sanction from slavery contracts or usury contracts, if the legislators are motivated by a desire to benefit the Smiths of the world is in situations like the imaginary bread bargain, then they are not envisaging any restrictions on liberty against the will of the per sons being coerced, for their own benefit. % own feeling is that non-paternalistic reasoning of this sort is sufficiently realistic to justify any anti-slavery or anti-usury laws that are in fact justifi able.
Pood and Drug Administration regulations which require accurate labelling of products and pre-marketing tests to determine the side ef fects of ingesting new or unfamiliar substances can for the most part take shelter under a similar non-paternalist rationale. We may draw a rough distinction between information relevant to an agent's choices which the agent can (readily) obtain for himself, and information which is either unobtainable by the agent or so difficult of attainment as to be for all practical purposes unobtainable. When the state requires drug companies to supply accurate information about the products they offer for sale, which the consumer would have grave difficulty obtaining on his own, the state is arguably not acting paternalistically. The state is enforcing requirements at which the will of the consumer may be presumed not to balk. (Naturally if this presumption proves false, the non-paternalistic appearances may prove deceptive.)
If there is practical doubt as to whether consumers really do want warning labels on their cigarette packages, truth-in-lending regulations that call to their attention the interest rates they are paying, and so forth, these laws can be drafted so as to apply only to those who ex plicitly consent to them (perhaps by checking a special box on their income tax form). Similar remarks would also apply to laws that specify stiff penalties for individuals who fail to fasten their automobile seatbelts, so long as the laws were worded so that they applied only to individuals who want this protection. Dworkin writes, unobjectionably, "1 suggest that since we are all aware of our irrational propensities, deficiencies in cognitive and emotional capacities, and avoidable and unavoidable ignorance, it is rational and prudent for us to in effect take out "social insurance policies.'"' So far the waters are crystal clear, but the next sentence muddies them: "We may argue for and against proposed paternalistic measures," Dworkin continues, "in terms of what 94 A-9 fully rational Individuals would accept as forms of protection."9 The line between restrictions that persons do accept, acknowledging their own propensity to Irrationality, and restrictions that persons reject but which imaginary rational persons would accept, is the line between non-paternalistic and paternalistic restrictions.
Laws requiring people to spend a certain percentage of their income on Social Security retirement benefits provide another borderline exam ple. Perhaps none would try to justify such laws on the ground that they effect a redistribution of income from the short-lived to the longlived, but the laws as presently structured also redistribute income from those who have steady lifelong employment to those whose employment is intermittent, and this may motivate passage of the laws. Also, it may be felt that the effect of Social Security laws is to require em ployers to contribute to employee retirement plans without in practice reducing workers' take-home pay. Whether right or wrong, such reasonings are non-patemalistic.
Laws that preclude consent as a defense to a legal charge of assault or homicide can be non-paternalistically justifiable, as seme comnentators have noticed.10 The situations in which individuals are threatened with assault are also situations in which the perpetrators of assault have the means to coerce their victims into ' ' consent" (to avert a threatened worse consequence). Since consent is likely to be bogus in the vast number of cases, and the possibilities of getting evidence that discriminates genuine from bogus consent are slight, the law may be jus tified in ruling out such a defense. (Perhaps the law could be drafted so as to recognize the defense In a range of cases where the normal dif ficulty of assessing evidence of consent is not present, as for example in pacts between lovers in which each agrees that in case of adultery the aggrieved lover may take violent revenge against the other without penalty.) Paternalism will look morally more Inviting than in fact it is, if we fail to separate actual cases of paternalistic restriction from cases which look similar but upon examination prove to be based on reasons of an altogether different sort.
II.
Mill's argument against paternalism is woven of various strands, not all of which mesh smoothly together. One strand is straightforwardly Utilitarian, arguing that interferences with a person's liberty calcu lated to advance his own good always result in an overall diminution of Dworkin, p. l8l. Critics of Mill have raised reasonable doubts as to whether these straightforward Utilitarian arguments will suffice to justify Mill's absolute prohibition on paternalism. Interwoven with these arguments is an ideal Utilitarian strand of thought, which asserts that freedom of choice is intrinsically a very great good, and that paternalistic inter ference with liberty always thwarts freedom of choice. This ideal Utilitarian argument appears to leave it open that paternalism while sacrificing free choice might succeed in gaining other goods that over balance the loss of free choice, and that one may justifiably block a person's free choice at one moment in order to maximize his long-run index of free choices. The second of these arguments Mill seems to en dorse in his puzzling discussion of voluntary slavery contracts, which concludes, "The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom." (p. 125) Translating this passage into less rhetorical lan guage, Dworkin interprets Mill to be saying, "Paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in ques tion." Elaborating this view, Dworkin asserts that the best defenses of particular paternalist policies are formulated "in the terms which Mill thought to be so important-a concern not just for the happiness or wel fare, in seme broad sense, of the individual but rather a concern for the autonomy and freedom of the person. I suggest that we would be most likely to consent to paternalism in those instances in which it preserves and enhances for the individual his ability to rationally consider and carry out his own decisions."12 ■ ' ■ ■ ' " I t is hard to say whether it is right to attribute to Mill this view as to the nature of "good" or "happiness." When he is arguing against the objection that Benthamite Utilitarianism acknowledges only one mo tive, the desire for pleasure, Mill tends to talk as though a person's pleasure is just the satisfaction of his desires (cf. chapter 4 of Utilitarianism). When his attention is focussed on what he takes to be the unenlightened character of most people's desires, Mill tends to talk in ways that stress how Utilitarianism defines the good objectively, in terms of pleasurable experience; in this way his alms to forestall the necessity of asserting that if the vast majority of people happened to develop an intense desire, say, to burn Catholics, the satisfaction of that desire must appear as a very large plus in Utilitarian calculation. I think these diverse and apparently conflicting ways of talking can be reconciled around the view ascribed to Mill in the text, but I cannot argue the matter here.
■'"^Dworkin, p. l80 and p. 184.
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This way of reading Mill gives rise to difficulties. One is how we are to square Mill's intolerance of voluntary slavery contracts with his initial formulation of his anti-paternalist principle, stated in terms of an absolute prohibition. Ascribing to Mill the principle that paterna list restrictions that maximize freedom may be justifiable, Dworkin tacitly abandons Mill's initial bold statement. In company with Dworkin I believe that when Mill says "Paternalism sometimes" in chapter four he is retracting the robust assertion of "Paternalism never!" in chapter one, and that consequently one or the other of these claims must be abandoned. But contrary to Dworkin, I believe we are better advised to hold onto the robust statement of principle and to discard the discus sion that qualifies it to death. My suggestion as to what tempts Mill to this wavering on fundamentals is that he is led astray by a correct belief that prohibition of slavery is justifiable. Neglecting the pos sibility of non-patemalist rationales for prohibiting even voluntary slavery, Mill is forced to the unwelcome conclusion that there must be a paternalistic justification, which flatly contradicts his earlier asser tion of principle.
What of Dworkin's positive suggestion that paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the agent? It suffers from disabling weaknesses. No explanation is given of how it is con sistent for the Utilitarian Mill to assert that restrictions on freedom are permissible only to maximize freedom, rather than to maximize other values that may outweigh freedom. A related difficulty attaches to the project of measuring freedom in order to apply the freedom-maximizing principle. Why not ban cigarettes and fried foods on the ground that these shorten the individual's lifespan and thereby shrink the range of his freedom? Perhaps one could avert this repressive consequence by stipulating that various freedoms must be weighted by their importance to the agent, so that a man who loves fried food may lose more by the denial of the freedom to enjoy a greasy diet than he would gain by the freedom to enjoy a longer, fat-free existence. But this gambit threat ens to collapse freedom-maximization into utility-maximization.
Dworkin advances the freedom-maximizing test for paternalism somewhat diffidently, and he qualifies his assertion of it by offering two alter nate suggestions. One, quoted above, is that "we would be most likely to consent to paternalism" when it heightens a person's ability to lead a rationally ordered life. A second suggestion is that paternalism is justified on those occasions when the individual being coerced would have consented to the restriction if he were rational. A common failing of both suggestions is that they fail adequately to safeguard the right of persons to choose and pursue life plans that deviate from maximal rationality or that hamper future prospects of rational choice. Although Dworkin is careful and even grudging in allowing that putative instances of justified paternalism according to his principles are actually justi fied, nonetheless some of his examples are chilling. He does approve the following restrictions: (1) forbidding the driving of an automobile without a seat belt when we are sure the person we are coercing does not 97 
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have eccentric values but is just mistaken in calculating how slight probabilities of very grave hams ought to affect his behavior, (2) banning the sale of cigarettes to persons who know the relevant facts but fail to appreciate them when deciding whether or not to smoke, and (3) forcing those who would commit suicide to submit to a governmentenforced cooling-off period and to appear before a Government Suicide Board to talk matters over in a cool hour. Taking just the last ex ample, and recalling that according to our notion of paternalism a person worried about his tendency to extreme depression could volun tarily place himself under the coercive care of others, I want to query the legitimacy of forcing the individual in these circumstances. Let there be suicide prevention services that individuals may avail them selves of if they choose, but persons who come to have the desire to commit suicide on sudden impulse or in some other manner incompatible with bureaucratic procedure have a right to die as they choose.
Dworkin is on the right track in discerning among Mill's arguments against paternalism "one which relies not on the goods which free choice leads to but on the absolute value of the choice itself."13 The freedommaximizing principle he offers is not the only possible construal of this argument.
There is an ambiguity in Mill's notion of freedom that substantially affects his argument, and that we may remove by distinguishing between autonomy and freedom. Mill says "freedom consists in doing what one wants," (p. 117) or in other words a person lives freely to the degree that he has the opportunity to do what he wants. Let us say a person lives autonomously to the extent that he is not forcibly prevented from acting on his voluntary self-regarding choice-even if that choice threatens grave risk to himself, including the risk that he may be un able in future to act on or even formulate further voluntary choices. Thus, suppose A proposes to make a public announcement of his plan to travel to the North Pole. B, his friend, knows that the trip to the North Pole will fulfill A's lifelong ambition while the announcement is a trivial matter, and he also knows that if A makes his announcement the state authorities will, for paternalistic reasons, prevent A from em barking on his trip. B remonstrates with A but fails to convince him that B's fear of state intervention is reasonable. In this situation, for B to coerce A from making his announcement in order to assure the fulfill ment of A's lifelong ambition lessens A's autonomy. The root idea of autonomy is that in making a voluntary choice a person takes on responsi bility for all the consequences to himself that flow from this voluntary choice. Paternalistic actions wrongfully usurp this responsibility. Very simply put, the difference between freedom and autonomy is that in some circumstances one can increase a person's freedom in the long run by restricting it whereas in no circumstances can one increase a person's ■ * "Dworkin, p. l80. Mill's text suggests a stronger argument to supplement the preceding. Mill tries to elicit our assent to the conclusion, "It really is of im portance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." (p. 72) He offers this thought-experiment: supposing it were possible to accomplish the business of life by machine labor, leaving humans passive and indolent, would it not be preferable to shift labor to humans so that good human beings are produced along with good houses, com, battles, churches, and so forth? A variant of Mill's thought-experiment will help discriminate our response to the closely related values of freedom and autonomy. Imagine that the development of technology permits society to equip each person with a mechanical ro bot capable of monitoring the individual's behavior and gently but coercively correcting it whenever it threatens to lessen his freedom This conclusion may seem glib. What Is It about ordinary human life which we prize that life guarded by robots would deny us? One Is tempted to say we prize the riskiness of human life. The troubling feature of the robot Is that whatever values It Is programmed to secure, It realizes without fall. But we could vary the example by adding a randomizing device to the robot so that with any probability we like the machine will fail to Intervene on any given occasion. Perhaps what we value that robot-protected life denies us Is the experience of risks whose overcoming Is up to us. But of course we could set the machine so that it supplies any preferred number of such risks. Notice that the robot allows us to live out our own lives, subject to some restriction, We could feel pride In making a rational self-regarding decision and implementing It successfully without triggering Interference by our robot-guardian. All that the robot denies us Is the opportunity to live out our lives without paternalistic control. This emerges even more clearly when we reflect that In a technologically advanced non-patemalistic society persons would enjoy the freedom to place themselves under robot guardians If they so chose. Indeed Individuals with some bizarre preferences would be irrational not to accept such guardianship. Con sider a person whose sole value is freedom-maximization, In relation to a robot set to maximize freedom, or a person whose sole value is ex periencing pleasure, In relation to a robot set to maximize pleasure. For such persons, the disinclination to accept mechanical guardianship would be no more rational or admirable than a person's stubborn Insistence on opening a bottle with bare hands, refusing to use a bottle-opener or other handy technological aid, when his only goal in view is to quench his thirst. If we are content to leave these individuals to their chosen fate that again confirms our underlying commitment to autonomy. Mill comments: "It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth...that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of culti vation." (p. 7 6 ; see also p. 87) Here a fair synonym for "individual" is "unique" or "idiosyncratic," and the cultivation of individuality will be identical with the cultivation of variety or diversity in human natures. This idea of individuality has puzzled conmentators. So con strued, individuality can hardly buttress a strong argument against paternalism. In the absence of all pressure of coercion or undue in fluence, persons may and in fact often do choose to imitate others rather than to make themselves unique; this tendency to conformity could be countered by authoritative order requiring the cultivation of diversity. The human results of this policy might not be pleasant to contemplate, but would surely be various.
Another conception of individuality prominent in the "Of Individual ity" chapter is individuality as human perfection or the development of traits that are "the distinctive endowment of a human being." In this sense "individuality" contrasts with "mediocrity." We may agree with Mill that this sort of individuality is worth securing without agreeing that a policy of freedom and wide tolerance is the best means of se curing it. Mill says, "He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation." (p. 71) Surely whether this is so de pends on the nature of the life plans that the world is enforcing, Mill was worried about the "pinched and hidebound type of human character" which Victorian customs sanctioned, but better customs could dictate that each individual strive to achieve as much excellence in art and science as he is capable of. Mill's target here really seems to be not so much paternalism as philistine paternalism. One can be overly glib about the extent to which government coercion can successfully foster human perfection, but the difficulty is that Mill says so little in de fense of his own controversial view on this issue. 1 7
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A third conception of individuality that figures In "Of Individuality" concerns the development of traits that are "properly one's own" or of "heme growth." Of desires, Mill says they are "one's own" when they are "the expression of his own nature, as It has been modified and developed by his own culture." (p. 73) This In vague In the extreme. Perhaps it means that a person's desires are his own to the extent that the ex planation of how they have come to be as they are must make reference to the Individual's own actions and inherent dispositions rather than the Influence of other persons. This leaves it mysterious why adult educa tion and the influence of a Coleridgean clerisy, both of which Mill favors, are not in direct conflict with individuality. The most plausi ble view I can locate in Mill's words here is a notion of individuality that is roughly equivalent to self-culture-the uncoerced positing by the individual of an ideal of himself and the making of efforts to con form himself to that ideal. Mill's remarks on the "desire of perfection" in his 1838 essay on "Bentham" suggest this reading.18 It is a merit of this interpretation of Mill's third sense of individuality that accord ing to it the reason why freedom is thought to be prerequisite to individuality is plain. Without freedom the individual cannot pursue self-culture. However, the connection between freedom and individuality, while plain, is not tight. Individuals make choices against self culture, and they even make choices that irrevocably destroy possibili ties of pursuing self-culture at some later date. So far as individuality is concerned, then, it might be justified to restrict a person's freedom paternalistically in order to maximize his long-range opportunities for individuality.
(Parenthetically we may remark that autonomy may only be only a great value for beings capable of individuality in this last sense. Ihe capacity for individuality elevates humans into the class of creatures which ought to be treated as autonomous. But autonomous life does not cease to be a good for such persons even if they live autonomously in ways that diminish their individuality. We rightly feel much greater qualms about coercing a lazy human beachcomber than about coercing a dog who lazes about the beach in identical fashion but could not be said to have chosen his style of life. This is so even when we are most certain we know better how to improve the beachcomber's life than the dog's.) On analogy with freedom of speech, freedom of action is justifiable (in part) because the practical execution of diverse life plans by free individuals yields a store of information which everybody needs in order to make rational decisions about his own plan of life. Disastrous life plans can set an instructive example for others as well as life plans that turn out favorably. Even in extreme cases where individuals vol untarily choose catastrophe for themselves, intervention will weaken the general atmosphere of freedom that we know is as difficult to main tain as it is necessary to human flourishing.
So far my argument has been that on either a straightforward of ideal
Utilitarian reading, distinguishing autonomy and freedom more explicitly than did Mill renders his position more credible. Since paternalistic restrictions always decrease a person's autonomy, upholding that value of autonomy helps defend an absolute prohibition against paternalism. The extent of the help thus rendered will depend on how autonomy is weighted against other values. It would seem that nothing short of a lexicographic ordering of values placing autonomy first would suffice to guarantee that one's condemnation of paternalism will not admit of exceptions. Short of that extreme weighting, one can say that the more one values autonomy the less Mill's espousal of libertarianism is sub ject to contingency. My last suggestion is that insofar as Mill relies on firm contingency his position is unshaky. Perhaps we could summarize Mill so: given that autonomy is a great value, paternalistic restric tions will never (or hardly ever) advance the interests of the individ uals they are intended to benefit. Moreover, the long-run indirect consequences of paternalism are likely to be very bad-i.e. inimical to social progress-for just the same reasons that the long-run indirect consequences of suppression of speech are likely to be very bad. The two arguments subtly reinforce one another, and do not contradict obvi ous facts such as that in specific circumstances coercing an individual may make him more unique, more rational, or even more self-cultured than would the alternative of letting him be. If one thinks of voluntariness as relative to the description of an act, then I may be acting voluntarily in putting what I believe to be salt on my food and involuntarily at the same moment in putting what is in fact deadly poison on my food. However, while it seems correct to say that the act under the description that exhibits its mistaken quality is nonvoluntary, it does not follow that the act tout courthowever described-is nonvoluntary. For purposes of assigning legal responsibility, as in negligence cases, it makes sense to say the act was voluntary in one respect but not in another, but when the question at issue is whether to uphold or withdraw the liberty of a person to do some (variously describable) act, some overall determination of the voluntary or nonvoluntary character of the act seems requisite. Feiriberg uses an example similar to that described above to argue that the act of one who poisons himself by mistake is at the extreme end of the scale of nonvoluntariness, and so presumably liable to justified paternalistic intervention. I cannot see how to accept this view with out committing oneself to the distinctly un-Millian position that all acts involving mistakes are nonvoluntary and as such fall beyond the protected scope of the anti-paternalism principle.
Ill
Mill clearly believes that in the sphere of self-regarding action people have the right to make their own mistakes and suffer the conse quences, without interference by society. For exanple, he asserts, "If a person possesses any tolerable amount of cannon sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode." Mill is quite pre pared to tolerate deviations from rationality that occur though a person's exercise of autonomous choice. Also, his entire discussion of how it is fitting to treat persons whose self-regarding faults render their company odious, granted that neither threat of punishment nor other coercion would be appropriate behavior, presupposes that persons have a right to choose even stupid and degrading life-courses without Two passages in On Liberty, and a parallel passage elsewhere, seem to allow that mistakes can place self-regarding acts beyond the protec tion of Mill's anti-paternalism principle. One is unproblematic for my interpretation. Mill urges that it is permissible temporarily to detain a man about to venture on an objectively unsafe bridge, in order to in form him of its unsafe condition. Here there would be no grounds for even temporary interference if the bridge were plained marked "UNSAFE" in letters visible to the man approaching. It is the circumstance that the man walking on the bridge lacks information he may be presumed to need, and cannot gain by himself, that justifies restraint.
The other two passages, one in On Liberty and the other in Principles of Political Economy,25 concern the mooted refusal of the state to en force contracts whose terms call for a long-term irrevocable forfeiture of liberty by one party. The two examples which Mill discusses are slavery contracts and marriage vows that disavow the possibility of divorce.
Mill argues that in such cases the normal presumption that individ uals know their own interests better than outsiders does not obtain, because individuals are making judgments about what their future inter ests will be at some remote future time. This argument is not without force. A young adult contemplating permanent marriage is better ad vised to consult novels of family life and sociological studies of marriage than his own romantic feelings, for guidance about his decision, and these sources are as available to state authority as to the individ ual. If taken seriously, however, the argument undermines more of Mill's anti-paternalism than he cares to admit. As a matter of fact it is often the case that persons other than the agent are in a better position to judge the individual's present as well as future interests. Mill says "with respect to his own feelings and circumstances the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else," but sadly it is often the case that the young adult's psychiatrist, his parents, relatives, peergroup friends, even passing acquaintances and back-fence neighbors have more insight into his true motives for contemplating marriage and his true interests in the matter than the young adult himself has. If it is a truism that people are very different from one another (and so often unable to judge one another's interests), it is no less a truism that people are very much alike (and so sometimes able to make strik ingly accurate judgments about what's best for another).
25op. cit., in Collected Works, vol. 3» pp. 953-95^.
R-10
The suggestion here developed for construing Mill's position is that his false belief that people generally are better able than outside ob servers to know their own interests leads him to the further false belief that in the limited range of cases where this generality fails to hold one can accept paternalistic incursions on liberty without com mitting oneself to approval of widespread paternalism.25a Mill's arguments regarding long-term forfeiture of liberty prove too much, establishing reasons for intervention that apply far beyond the sphere in which Mill apparently hoped they could be contained. A further anomaly in Mill's position is that his discussions fail to establish that while taking account of all the reasons that weigh against pater nalism in general, one can find paternalism acceptable in this class of cases. The slavery discussion in On Liberty points out only that paternalistic restrictions can here maximize freedom, and the long-term contract discussion in Principles of Political Econany points out only that forbidding long-term irrevocable contracts can boost the utility of the agents involved. Assessing the balance of Mill's claims, I reiter ate my suggestion that the best way to ease this internal tension in Mill's view is to strike the wayward passages that give rise to it.
There is warrant in Mill's text for supposing that the acts which a principle of anti-paternalism should be concerned to protect comprise just the class of voluntary self-regarding actions. Reverting to Mill's initial articulation of his principle, we may say that when we forcibly prevent a person from carrying out nonvoluntary acts we are not coercing him "against his will." However, there is scant evidence for ascribing to Mill anything resembling Feiriberg's expanded notion of the voluntary, and no evidence at all for attributing to Mill a denial of what I take to be fundamental to anti-paternalism, viz. the claim that people have a right to make their own mistakes and live out their own lives in accordance with them, however disastrous (we might say) are the conse quences to themselves. Condition (a) implies that if a person sees a warning sign on a high way, does not bother to read it, and subsequently crashes, his driving is voluntary. Whereas, a person who is fraudulently deceived, or who had no opportunity to learn the true facts of the situation in which he acts, acts in a less than fully voluntary manner. Condition (b) follows closely Mill's admonition that if one is "a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflective faculty," he may be forcibly restrained from perform ing actions that a non-delirious non-excited adult ought to be at full liberty to do. I take it that "full use of the reflective faculty" is not meant to be tantamount to "maximum rationality," nor it it ruled out that a person in an excited state, while capable of settling down and deliberating, might decide to act impetuously-without thereby rendering his conduct nonvoluntary or making himself susceptible to justified state interference. Condition ( University of California Press, 1976), p . 585. This anecdote suggests another point that is unrelated to the voluntariness issue. Suppose the climber's foolhardy adventure is bizarrely out of character. For the sake of argument, let us concede that perhaps an intimate friend of the climber would be justified in restraining him on this occasion. Still, even granting so much, we need not accept that state interference in these circumstances could be justified, because the state is not and should not be privy to the special and private information that perhaps legitimizes a friend's interference. As Mill remarks in the context of welfare relief policy, "the state must act by general rules," and state officials "have no business to be inquisitive." This argument could be run in reverse: since the state cannot have access to the information that would permit it to discriminate in such cases, a paternalistic justification for the bizarre case willy-nilly justifies coercion in the non-bizarre cases. What blocks running the argument in reverse is the high value Mill wants us to place on autonomy: it is better to leave alone the bizarre choices of many persons than to restrict the autonomy of a few.
B-14
Still more important, I think, is this: when a person's weakly voluntary acts fail to express his settled preferences, state inter ference is still wrongful, so if we are defining "voluntary, ' for the purpose of delimiting the limits of state interference, we should adopt my weak analysis in preference to Feiriberg's strong view. Weak volun tariness guarantees that a person was capable of exercising his full rational powers without being led astray by misinformation at the time he makes his choice. A person who is capable of thinking matters out and does not should be held responsible for his choice. In the area of self-regarding action this means he should be let alone. Particu larly when we recall that a person can voluntarily commit himself to the coercive care of others, we should not view a person's disposition to be irrational, to make mistakes, or to misidentify his most cherished values as an external force directing choice, alien to the self, From Feinberg's expanded definition of "voluntariness" or "deliberate choice" we can reconstruct one further reason for preferring his defi nition over mine. According to Feiriberg, a deliberately chosen act does not proceed from compulsion or neurosis, This suggests the fol lowing reason for adhering to strong voluntariness; even in cases where a person's choice of action faithfully represents his strongest desire, the process by which one's strongest desire is formed may be so erractic or inimical to the self as to alienate a person from that strongest desire. Consider in this regard a drug addict with conflicted desires. Suppose the addict wants to take the drug but also wants not to want to take the drug. Supposing we can characterize the addictive desire as compulsive, do we not have good reason to intervene paterna list ically on behalf of the addict's "real will" abjuring the desire to take drugs? I think not, for at least three reasons, First, from the description given it does not follow that the addict's higher-order desire is allied with his true self or "real will," One's higher-order desires may be disreputable or for some other reason not the desire one most identifies with. In most cases the strength of a desire correlates very well with the degree of a person's identification with it, Second, even assuming we can sensibly characterize the addict as identifying his "real will" with his weaker higher-order desire, from the descrip tion given it does not follow that he has no way of satisfying that desire. For example, the addict can enroll himself in a drug rehabili tation program in which he will be coerced from acting on his stronger desire, to take the drug. The courts have rightly ruled that a person who commits himself to such a program may be forcibly kept to it with out being the victim of paternalistic deprivation of liberty.29 Third, as mentioned previously the addict's act of taking drugs now may fall within the scope of a prior voluntary act, and be exempt from paterna listic interference on this ground. For all these reasons we should draw the conclusion that even in this hard case the standard of weak 
IV.
In this final section I consider two arguments that trivialize Mill's ant i-pat emalism.
One insidious argument threatens to render the anti-paternalistic principle trivial by showing that acts that seemingly could be defended only by paternalistic reasoning, can secure a quite independent justi fication by recourse to pressing hard on the self-regarding/otherregarding distinction. Assume that any act that is prima facie justi fiable only through appeal to a paternalist principle will concern conduct that threatens serious harm to the agent. If such conduct is permitted, and the serious harm eventuates, then (unless the harm is death) the individual will be in grave need of assistance. If there are charitable obligations that require us to provide assistance to those in grave need, no matter how the grave need originates, then these acts of individuals that threaten serious harm to themselves also threaten harm to others via the spawning of these charitable obligations. In other words, there are virtually no significant self-regarding actions, so the anti-paternalist principle is vacuous.
The doubtful premise in the above argument is the premise that asserts that charitable obligations arise whenever individuals are in grave need. Even if for the sake of argument we allow that obligations of charity are very strong, they are not so strong as to extend to individuals who considered the possibility that their acts might go awry and place them selves in grave need and who disavowed in advance any claim to assistance should this possibility cane about. Perhaps all of us are thoroughly tangled in webs of charitable obligation. But to preserve liberty we must at least permit individuals to disentangle themselves from the web, to divest themselves of any responsibility for behaving prudently so as to avoid placing others under the risk of incurring charitable obliga tions .
Elaborating the view that charity can justify repression, Feiriberg urges that to allow persons to gamble away their life prospects reck lessly and suffer the consequences "would be to render the whole national character cold and hard.. It would encourage insensitivity generally and inpose an unfair economic penalty on those who possess the socially useful virtue of benevolence. Realistically, we just can't let men wither and die right in front of our eyes."30 Another writer comments, ". . .being put in a position where one must undertake some burden or expense if one is to satisfy one's moral obligations (as Feiriberg, p. 119. 
C-4
thinking has scant relevance to the problem of classifying restraints as paternalistic.
Parfit arbitrarily stipulates what will count as the psychological continuities that form the objective component in personal identity judgments. He says: "Let us call 'direct' the psychological relations which hold between: the memory of an experience and this experience, the intention to perform some later action and this action, and differ ent expressions of some lasting character-trait."35 Parfit offers no argument for the view that only these relations are important in per sonal identity. I suggest several additions to Parfit's list. If these additions are accepted, there is much less scope for the re description of paternalist acts of the sort described three paragraphs back. Let us also call 'direct' the psychological relations which hold between: (i) the intention to act so as to change one's character and the character change that results, (ii) the intention to perform some act and changes in one's character that are the foreseen consequences of that act, (iii) the intention to perform some act and changes in one's character that are foreseeable consequences of that act. And let us continue to say, with Parfit, that the greater are the direct psy chological relations obtaining between successive states of (purportedly the same) person, the greater the factual basis for asserting personal identity.
Of the suggested additions, (i) is easiest to defend. Suppose one undergoes psychotherapy in order to effect a drastic personality change, and this intention is successfully realized. A sufficiently drastic personality change can make it unlikely that any of Parfit's direct psychological relations hold between the pre-and post-therapy person. But surely one's intention to make just these changes binds together these successive person-states and grounds a judgment that the two are one person. Somewhat less compelling but still intuitive is acceptance of (ii). Suppose a person chooses to emigrate to Switzerland, aware that there is a strong likelihood that his move will cause him to be similar in personality to some Swiss citizens he knows. The fact that at the very least the person accepts these personality changes in ad vance as side effects of an action that he voluntarily embraces serves to provide continuity sufficient for identity. Many cases of drug ad diction would seem to fall within this category. Perhaps more tendentious is (iii). Suppose a person chooses to ride a motorcycle bareheaded while wilfully ignorant of the statistics on accidents in volving unhelmeted cyclists. A statistically likely accident occurs and the cyclist's body and, eventually, his personality are permanently disabled. I believe the fact that the cyclist could have foreseen the consequences to himself of his act had he chosen to do so provides a ■^Parfit, "Later Selves and Moral Principles," p. 139-A more ex tended analysis appears in "Personal Identity," section III.
